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We investigate how competing logics facilitate resistance to institutional change,
focusing on banking professionals’ resistance to large, national banks’ acquisitions of
smaller, local banks. Acquisitions led to new bank foundings, particularly when
out-of-town banks were the acquirers and a community’s local population of bank
professionals was large. We argue that the national banks’ efforts to introduce a
banking logic emphasizing efficiencies of geographic diversification triggered new
forms of professional entrepreneurialism intended to preserve a community logic of
banking. Contributions to a synthesis of ecological and institutional perspectives and
to research on entrepreneurship and resistance to institutional change are discussed.
Over the past few years, institutionalists have
shifted attention away from the study of isomor-
phic diffusion to develop more nuanced ap-
proaches to the study of organizational variation
and change (e.g., Kraatz & Moore, 2002; Leblebici,
Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; Lounsbury, 2001;
Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Marquis,
Glynn, & Davis, 2007). Despite this redirection of
scholarly effort, little attention has been paid to
how and under what conditions organizations, pro-
fessionals, and other actors resist broader-scale in-
stitutional changes, such as those catalyzed by the
passage of regulatory acts (Schneiberg & Bartley,
2001). Oliver (1991) argued that resistance is a key
but little understood strategic response to institu-
tional pressures and that more research is needed
on the processes and mechanisms by which insti-
tutional change is contested. Such a focus on resis-
tance is important because it can help to revise the
more passive conceptualizations of organizational
action that have dominated institutional theorizing
(Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997) by highlighting the ac-
tive role of organizations and other actors in nego-
tiating and shaping their environments. In addi-
tion, since resistance hinders isomorphism, a focus
on resistance will help develop greater insight into
how organizational variety emerges and is sus-
tained in organizational fields (Aldrich & Ruef,
2006; Davis & Marquis, 2005). In this article, we
seek to expand understanding of institutional and
competitive dynamics by exploring the sources of
actor resistance to change.
Recent work has shown that as fields change,
aggrieved actors may be activated to countermobi-
lize to protect their jurisdictions and established
routines (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005;
Wade, Swaminathan, & Saxon, 1998). Abbott
(1988), for instance, showed how the status and
scope of professions could be understood by focus-
ing on ongoing interprofessional conflicts and
resistance over jurisdictional boundaries. In the
context of markets, firms may compete for jurisdic-
tional control by constructing barriers to entry and
forging monopolistic and oligopolistic advantage in
a particular product-market or geographically de-
lineated space (Scherer, 1980). And recently, sev-
eral scholars in economic sociology and organiza-
tional theory have employed institutional analysis
to reveal how the social organization of industries
and fields, including the demographic mix of kinds
of organizations, is fundamentally shaped by such
jurisdictional struggles (e.g., Fligstein, 1996, 2001;
Haveman & Rao, 1997; Lounsbury, Ventresca, &
Hirsch, 2003; Scott, Reuf, Mendel, & Caronna,
2000; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
A core idea emerging in this literature is the
concept of logic, which generally refers to broad
cultural beliefs and rules that structure cognition
and fundamentally shape decision making and ac-
tion in a field (e.g., see Thornton, 2002, 2004). As
Scott and his coauthors (2000) demonstrated in the
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context of U.S. health care, changes in logics over
time go hand-in-hand with changes in field gover-
nance arrangements. In a similar vein, Thornton
and Ocasio (1999) showed how a shift from a pro-
fessional to a market logic in higher education pub-
lishing led to corollary changes in corporate gover-
nance practices.
Some scholars have begun to extend this work by
drawing on the competing logic imagery of Fried-
land and Alford (1991) to shed light on how mul-
tiple kinds of historically rooted belief systems pro-
vide the foundation for ongoing conflict and
change (e.g., Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Lounsbury, 2007;
Reay & Hinings, 2005; Stryker, 1994). For instance,
Fiss and Zajac (2004) examined how different ori-
entations toward corporate governance—corporat-
ist and shareholder value—led to dramatic shifts in
German corporations’ use of United States–style
governance. Lounsbury (2007) extended this ap-
proach by demonstrating how contending logics
fundamentally shape variation in the practices and
behavior of distinct groups of actors; mutual funds
in Boston resisted the efforts of New York funds to
push aggressive growth money management strate-
gies by maintaining a focus on conservative, long-
term investing. Despite this new emphasis on com-
peting logics and conflict, there has been no
examination of resistance per se.
In this article, we build on this notion that
logics can be rooted in geographical differences
(Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis et al., 2007), high-
lighting how competing logics can provide a
foundation for resistance. In doing so, we aim to
redirect the study of resistance away from a more
narrow focus on strategic action (e.g., Oliver,
1991) to examination of how broader belief sys-
tems can shape such dynamics. In particular, we
focus on how community-level actors may oper-
ate with a “community” logic of governance in-
tended to protect local autonomy in the face of
efforts by nationally oriented outsiders to impose
a “national” logic of governance that focuses
more on efficiencies gained by standardization
over multiple geographic regions. For example,
many communities have mobilized resources and
energy to prevent mass-market firms such as Wal-
Mart or Starbucks from opening stores that might
threaten long-standing local establishments.
Such political protest to prevent entry by na-
tional chains into individual communities dem-
onstrates a particularly vivid type of resistance,
yet resistance can also come in less dramatic
forms (Hirschman, 1970). Organizational re-
searchers, for instance, have highlighted how
consumers’ expression of preferences and actions
in the marketplace can constitute resistance (Car-
roll & Swaminathan, 2000), as can the actions of
local professionals whose high level of human
and relational capital (e.g., Hitt, Bierman, Uhlen-
bruck, & Shimizu, 2006) enables mobility or the
ability to create organizational alternatives
(Haveman & Cohen, 1994; Schneiberg, 2007).
This tension between community and national
actors and logics has been particularly important in
the banking industry, dating to the founding of the
United States and the debate between Thomas Jef-
ferson and Alexander Hamilton over the benefits
and drawbacks of a national financial system.
Other notable historical episodes of jurisdictional
struggle in this sector include the “bank wars” of
the 1830s over Andrew Jackson’s revocation of the
charter of the Second Bank of the United States
(Hammond, 1957) and the branch banking debate
that pervaded the U.S. states and the nation for
much of the 20th century. In the 1990s, the passage
of a series of federal regulatory changes designed to
remove all prior geographic restrictions on bank
expansion led national banks to prey on commu-
nity banks as acquisition targets. The rhetoric sur-
rounding this national shift emphasized the effi-
ciency gains that would result from combining the
operations of existing banks into a smaller number
of large banks and threatened the community ori-
entation of many local banking infrastructures.
Economic work on banking suggests that commu-
nity stakeholders (e.g., borrowers) are hostile to
out-of-town banks (Seelig & Critchfield, 2002), yet
the resistance of local actors to these changes has
not been systematically explored. Communities or-
ganized substantial resistance via community non-
profits and groups such as the California Reinvest-
ment Committee, which, for instance, protested
Citigroup’s expansion into California in 2002. The
invading out-of-town banks were portrayed as “si-
phoning banks away” (Prial, 2000), and local ads
counseled consumers not to “give your money to
strangers” (Allen & Pae, 1991). Although there were
a variety of such dramatic examples of political
protest, press and banking trade journals also sug-
gested that these acquisitions laid the groundwork
for resistance by creating pools of bank executives
who could found new banks (e.g., Epstein, 1996;
Gillam, 1998; Murray, 1998; Zellner, 1998). We ar-
gue that these new banks represented not only a
new form of economic competition for consolidat-
ing banks, but also a kind of countermovement
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996) whose agents
aimed to resist the imposition of a national logic of
governance upon the local banking infrastructure.
We specifically examine how the acquisition-
driven consolidation efforts of national banks facil-
itated a form of resistance, namely, the creation of
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competing community banks by professional bank-
ers, many of whom had left consolidating banks. By
focusing on the relationship between organization-
al dynamics and professionals, our research ad-
dresses a key link between interorganizational pro-
cesses and more individual-level “human capital”
(e.g., Hitt et al., 2006). In this tradition, Haveman
and Cohen (1994) highlighted the importance of
studying how mergers among California savings
and loans facilitated the mobility of bank execu-
tives, although it indirectly led to a decrease in
mobility as “vacancy chains” were closed. Con-
versely, Stuart and Sorenson (2003) studied how
biotech entrepreneurs emerged following “liquid-
ity events” such as acquisitions that weakened fi-
nancial bonds between technologists and their
organizations.
We extend this research by examining how some
types of acquisitions, conditioned by institutional
logics, may systematically open up entrepreneurial
opportunities for professionals (McGrath & Mac-
Millan, 2000). We show that consolidation of local
banking markets by community actors does not
trigger the creation of new community banks by
local professionals but that consolidation promul-
gated by large national banks does. This finding
suggests that it is not competitive processes in a
generic sense that enable entrepreneurial action,
but particular forms of competitive dynamics re-
lated to the clash between community and national
logics. Thus, sensing “entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties” (Sarasvathy, 2001) is not a neutral, objective
occurrence but one perhaps embedded in broader
institutional dynamics involving competing logics.
By concentrating on the heterogeneous processes
by which professionals’ new community bank cre-
ation counters consolidation pressures, our ap-
proach takes on an ecological flavor. Existing work
in this area (e.g., Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000)
focuses on long-term industry transitions, but our
focus on a shorter time frame of dramatic consoli-
dation (cf. Stearns & Allan, 1996) and our fine-
grained, community-level data allowed us to un-
cover the possibility that institutional logics rooted
in geographical difference (Lounsbury, 2007; Mar-
quis, 2003; Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007) underlie
some market activities and shape the ecological
mix of organizations. Our paper contributes to the
understanding of resistance by highlighting the in-
stitutional contingency of community resistance to
regulation-driven consolidation. Given such resis-
tance, consolidation processes can yield organiza-
tional variation as opposed to homogeneity, which
has been the trope of institutional theorists for far
too long.
In the next section, we provide an overview of
the historically rooted tension between community
and national logics in U.S. banking and how the
national banks’ acquisition movement deepened
this long-standing schism, precipitating entrepre-
neurial action by local banking professionals. We
develop several hypotheses that we tested in data
on a population of U.S. banking communities from
1994 to 2002. We then discuss the implications of
this research for the study of resistance, entrepre-
neurship, and the merging of institutional and eco-
logical perspectives.
NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY LOGICS IN
U.S. BANKING
Whether banks should be controlled by local
community or national organizations is one of the
most enduring debates of U.S. history. Its roots can
be traced to the core philosophical positions of the
two major political parties present at the founding
of this republic. The Republicans, led by Thomas
Jefferson, preferred decentralized political and eco-
nomic systems under community control. The ma-
jor opposing party, the Federalists, led by Alex-
ander Hamilton, favored centralized political and
economic systems and established early national
banks in the United States. Although those on the
centralization side of this debate were able to es-
tablish a few early national banks, the country’s
earliest experience of national banking ended in
1836, when Andrew Jackson, expressing wariness
of consolidated financial power, vetoed the charter
renewal of the Second Bank of the United States.
Stated Jackson, “It is easy to conceive that great
evils to our country and its institutions might flow
from such a concentration of power of a few men
irresponsible to the people” (quoted in Roe,
1994: 58).
This tension has remained vivid throughout U.S.
banking history and has become embedded in
counterposing institutional logics that have in-
formed and shaped policy debates to this day. At
the turn of the 20th century, those who advocated
local control were in positions of power. But many
of the larger banks, seeing the advantage of expand-
ing beyond their headquarters communities, advo-
cated for a relaxation of the laws prohibiting
branching (Collis, 1926; Fischer, 1968). This group
argued that banks with branches were safer because
they were able to spread credit risk geographically.
Organized opposition to branching came from
small and medium-sized banks. Echoing Jackson,
they capitalized on public fear of consolidated cap-
ital, arguing that branching would sever an impor-
tant link between local bankers and community
borrowers. Opposition was mounted through the
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agency of trade associations (Ingram & Rao, 2004)
organized with the explicit goal of lobbying units of
government. For example, in 1923, the Kansas,
Missouri, and Pennsylvania bankers’ associations
all declared themselves opposed to branch banking
and actively worked to prevent the passage of pro-
branching legislation (White, 1985), and in 1930,
leaders of single-unit banks established the Inde-
pendent Bankers Association (Calomiris, 1993),
which came to be the primary national trade organ-
ization for community and independent banks.
Although the single-unit banks controlled only a
small percentage of overall industry assets, the
public and legislators often supported their view
because of their success in framing the debate as a
conflict between community banking and consoli-
dated capital. It was believed that communities,
individuals, and small businesses would suffer if
banks were managed by an “agent acting at a dis-
tance under delegated authority” (Charles Dawes,
comptroller of the currency in 1902, quoted in
Fischer, 1968: 28) and that banking dominated by
large banks would break the link between deposi-
tors and bank directors (Chapman & Westerfield,
1942; Fischer, 1968). There was strong agreement
among community-oriented banking professionals.
A mid-1930s survey found 90 percent of Nebraska
single-unit bank executives to be opposed to
branching (Kuhn, 1968).
Whereas the institutional logic of community bank-
ing focused on local control and avoidance of consol-
idated financial power, banking professionals from
larger banks, who were focused on expanding branch
networks, emphasized a national logic of economic
efficiency centered on the assumption that geo-
graphic diversification would lead to a more secure
banking system. William B. Ridgley, the comptroller
of the currency in 1903, opined as follows: “I believe
in branch banking. Theoretically, it is the best system,
as it is more economical, more efficient, will serve its
customers better, and the organization can be such as
to secure in most respects better management”
(quoted in Fischer, 1968: 29). As the 20th century
unfolded, this logic began gaining more widespread
support. By the late 1980s, a majority of U.S. states
permitted out-of-state banks to operate within their
borders. The federal government essentially ended
state restrictions on banking with the passage in 1994
of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act, which opened the door to a national
interstate branching network.1 As the word “effi-
ciency” in the name of the Riegle-Neal act suggests,
the explicit goal was to eliminate geographic barriers
perceived to impede scale in banking. This deregula-
tory period witnessedmanymergers and acquisitions
and the rise of a new form of organization, the
superregional bank.
Despite the growing power of national banks,
adherents of the community logic remained active
in contesting deregulation and its effects. Banking
professionals and community groups protested
many acquisitions of local firms. As noted, the
rhetoric was heated, and invading out-of-town
banks were portrayed as establishing foreign “col-
onies” (Finkelstein, 2002) and as having “lost the
idea of serving the community” (Tripp, 1999). Al-
though some lobbied government officials to pre-
vent these changes, more often the resistance took
the form of consumers supporting firms they felt
more authentically tapped their personal values
(Tripp, 1999; cf. Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000).
This support enabled an explosion of new commu-
nity bank foundings at the same time that massive
national consolidation was occurring. Some eco-
nomics-based commentators have described these
parallel events as a “paradox” (Moore & Skelton,
1998). However, examining consolidation as a pro-
cess that brought to the fore longstanding tensions
rooted in community versus national logics may
enable insights into the sources of community re-
sistance to the nationalization of banking via the
creation of new community banks.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Our theoretical focus is on the mechanisms
whereby professional bankers founded new com-
munity-oriented commercial banks amidst regula-
tion-triggered efforts to consolidate their industry.
Given the importance of this phenomenon, it is no
surprise that financial economists and other bank-
ing scholars have posited explanations. After using
this existing literature to present a hypothesis that
has been dominant in the literature on banking, we
develop a set of theoretically informed hypotheses
grounded in the growing corpus of work on insti-
1 Large banks heavily lobbied for the 1994 act. Nations
Bank CEO Hugh McColl theorized that expansion-
minded bank-holding companies that owned large banks
headquartered in major cities surrounded by rural areas
were particularly successful lobbyists because the geo-
graphic diversity of these heartland banks made it easier
for them to accumulate congressional votes (Kane, 1996).
The unsuccessful countermovement originated with
smaller banks represented by the Independent Bankers
Association of America (the national trade organization
for community and independent banks), the Conference
of State Bank Supervisors, and other unions of smaller
banks.
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tutional ecology (e.g., Carroll & Swaminathan,
2000; Wade, 1998). This work emphasizes both
competitive processes and the role of broader insti-
tutional processes related to legitimation (e.g.,
Baum & Powell, 1995) as well as shifts in logics
(e.g., Haveman & Rao, 1997). We extend this liter-
ature by examining how competing institutional
logics shape ecological dynamics. In addition, by
focusing on the role of organization-based profes-
sionals, we highlight how the human capital of
firms can provide a basis for resistance to change.
Bank Acquisitions and Foundings:
The Extant Banking Literature
A number of scholars have suggested that routine
competitive processes might account for a link be-
tween mergers and acquisitions and the founding
of new organizations in a given market. For in-
stance, existing research on banking suggests that
acquisitions create opportunities for smaller, newer
organizations that target niches at the periphery of
a market. The basic argument is that acquisitions
effect changes in the product offerings of merged
firms that facilitate start-ups, especially in product-
markets that larger firms tend to be less efficient at
serving. A presumably larger and more organiza-
tionally complex merged bank might, for example,
be expected to deemphasize consumer and small
business loans and services inasmuch as these
niches are not as amenable to scale economies as
corporate lending and fee-based services such as
investment banking (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999).
Supporting this view, Berger, Kashyap, and
Scalise (1995) found that larger banks devoted less
of their assets to small business lending, and they
suggested that large banks likely reduce small busi-
ness lending because it is less efficient. Keeton
(1995) found that front-line loan officers in larger
organizations have less discretion, which often de-
lays lending decisions for smaller customers. The
disruption to customers occasioned by consolida-
tion affords new banks an opportunity to steal cus-
tomers who perceive a reduction in service (Berger,
Bonime, Goldberg, & White, 1999). The bottom line
of these economically oriented studies is that the
primary causal mechanism behind bank founding
is perceived market needs. New banks are founded
to serve newly attractive and underserved market
niches left in the wake of mergers.
Hypothesis 1. The more local banks are ac-
quired in a community, the greater the found-
ing rate of new banks in that community.
An Institutional Ecology Approach
In contradistinction to the existing literature on
bank dynamics, an institutionally based ecological
approach is sensitive to how both competitive and
institutional processes influence outcomes of inter-
est via a focus on the actions and behaviors of
different kinds of actors and organizational forms.
For example, resource partitioning theorists pro-
pose a relationship between the consolidation of
markets and a proliferation of specialist organiza-
tions. They argue that as a market consolidates into
larger competitors, the target markets of those that
fail or are acquired become free, which opens up
peripheral resource niches. New specialist organi-
zations then fill these emergent resource spaces.
The statistical association between generalist con-
solidation and specialist proliferation has been
documented in a number of industries, including
newspapers (Carroll, 1985), beer brewing (Carroll &
Swaminathan, 2000), and winemaking (Swami-
nathan, 1995).
Carroll, Dobrev, and Swaminathan (2002) offered
three different explanations for why resource par-
titioning occurs: customization, conspicuous status
consumption, and anti–mass production cultural
sentiment. Customization has been studied in the
context of audit firms (Boone, Broecheler, & Car-
roll, 2000) and it is generally argued that specialist
organizations are able to provide greater personal-
ization and customization of products. Also, Car-
roll, Dobrev and Swaminathan (2002) wrote that
sometimes product status and conspicuous con-
sumption lead to the rise of specialists who can
better fill a niche—for example, the sustained suc-
cess of small boutique auto producers, such
as Porsche and Ferrari.
Closer to the issues of our study on banking con-
solidation and resistance is the mechanism of cul-
tural sentiment opposing mass production—a re-
jection of powerful mainstream producers in favor
of craft and specialty products. This mechanism
has been most prolifically explored in the context
of the microbrewing industry, where, Carroll and
Swaminathan (2000) argued, beer consumers prefer
products from smaller, independent brewers and
look to an organization’s identity when making
purchasing decisions. This preference enabled the
proliferation of microbreweries, which took on a
social movement–like quality. Supported by exten-
sive qualitative analyses of interviews and industry
reports, they showed that following the dramatic
consolidation of the postwar brewing industry to
only 43 firms in 1983, consumer pressures for al-
ternative products led to an explosion in new brew-
ery foundings and the creation of almost 1,500 spe-
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cialist firms by the turn of the 21st century. Thus,
increased concentration in a local market may trig-
ger a resource partitioning process that enables new
specialist community banks to be created. Hence,
Hypothesis 2. The greater the market concen-
tration of a local community, the greater the
founding rate of new banks in that community.
In contrast to the standard resource partitioning
approach, according to which greater concentration
will leave underserved niches, some ecologists
have drawn on the old industrial organization eco-
nomics literature (e.g., Scherer, 1980) to argue that
large incumbents may use market power to discour-
age entry (Bain, 1956). A number of studies of bank-
ing have tested this phenomenon, finding that mar-
kets with fewer larger competitors have higher
prices, which suggests that the large incumbent
firms can exercise market power (see Berger et al.
[1999] for a summary). For instance, Prager and
Hannan (1998) found that prices for deposit ac-
counts increased following merger-driven growth.
And Hanweck (1971) showed that new bank forma-
tion in 230 cities was negatively related to in-
creased market control by large players.
This focus on the negative influences of market
control on foundings provides an interesting coun-
terpoint to the resource partitioning arguments pos-
ited above. Even though these could be seen as
classic competing hypotheses, since industrial or-
ganization economists have typically operation-
alized market power with concentration ratios, the
organizational ecology literature suggests a differ-
ent operationalization that emphasizes the exis-
tence of multiple generalist organizations (e.g., Car-
roll & Swaminathan, 2000). This conceptualization
of market power is more of a complement to re-
source partitioning and is actually in line with Car-
roll’s (1985) original statement, which suggested
that having multiple strong generalist organizations
in a market discourages entry, because differentia-
tion among generalists leads them to focus on “a
variety of domains simultaneously” (Carroll, 1985:
1266). This is particularly apropos in banking,
since large national banks establish themselves on
the basis of their ability to leverage power and
expertise over distinct domains.
In our case, generalist banks with achieved mar-
ket power in commercial and real estate businesses
(the primary types of banking other than retail)
would be able to leverage their greater market reach
and profits to discourage retail-oriented start-ups
(see also Carroll & Swaminathan [2000] for a simi-
lar approach). Thus, our definition of a generalist is
a bank engaged in substantial efforts in the major
banking businesses of retail, commercial, and real
estate. Such banks of broad scope are almost always
nationally oriented, since the infrastructures re-
quired to support extensive products and services,
particularly those serving larger firms, are not eco-
nomically practical unless they can be leveraged
over multiple markets. Banks with a more commu-
nity orientation are typically much smaller and
focused on single market segments. Keeton (2000)
suggested that banks with commitments and activ-
ities that span a broader array of product offerings
will dissuade banking entrepreneurs from starting
smaller banks for fear of being driven out of busi-
ness. So in addition to any effect of market concen-
tration resulting from resource partitioning, we
may observe a negative relationship between large
generalist banks and start-ups. Hence:
Hypothesis 3. The greater the presence of gen-
eralist banks in a community, the lower the
rate of founding of new banks in that
community.
Although organizational demographers have
gone far in specifying the rise of specialist organi-
zations in consolidating markets, as well as the
effects of powerful generalist organizations, an im-
portant question remains: Who are the entrepre-
neurs that generate new specialist organizations?
Some organizational demographers have begun to
examine this question (e.g., Haveman & Cohen,
1994; Stuart & Sorensen, 2003), but more effort is
required to link organizational processes to the
more individual-level processes of entrepreneurs
who create organizations. In the context of profes-
sional service firms such as banks, professionals
themselves can often provide key motors for
change and resistance because they have signifi-
cant levels of human capital, often backed by spe-
cialized education, credentialing, and experiential
knowledge (Becker, 1976).
The importance of human capital is evident over
a wide range of professional services. For instance,
the human capital of lawyers enables law firms to
provide services related to intangible forms of
knowledge and information (e.g., Hitt, Bierman,
Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Hitt et al., 2006). In a
similar way, banking professionals design and sell
products that package intangible qualities of mon-
etary flows such as risk (Bernstein, 1996). Such
human capital provides a crucial resource that en-
ables a firm to attain higher levels of performance
and sustainable competitive advantage (Alvarez &
Barney, 2004; Barney, 1991). Further, banking pro-
fessionals have significant “relational capital”
(Uzzi, 1999), a resource that is developed over time
and is embedded in social relationships (Uzzi,
1997). As in the legal profession (Hitt et al., 2006;
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Spar, 1997), this capital is portable, as it frequently
resides in the relationships that individual banking
professionals have with their clients.
In other cases, professionals might become an
important resource for new organizations (e.g., Al-
drich & Ruef, 2006; Meyer, 1994; Ruef, 2000).
Meyer (1994) described this supply-side process
whereby certain types of actors, particularly in the
sciences and professions, occupy institutional roles
that enable and encourage them to devise and pro-
mote new kinds of organizations (Burton, Soren-
son, & Beckman, 2002; Freeman, 1986). For exam-
ple, a number of highly skilled engineers, who as
employees of Fairchild Semiconductor in the late
1950s and 1960s had access to unique knowledge
about semiconductor innovation and process, ex-
ited to found competing firms such as Intel, Ad-
vanced Micro Devices, and LSI Logic (Saxenian,
1994).
These effects may be expected to be particularly
pronounced in banking; professionalism, as Collins
(1979) argued, is essential in financial industries
that rely on credentials to gain and hold the public
trust. Banking executives, an elite subset of banking
professionals who are the key actors creating new
banks, are also bound by an extensive body of in-
dustry and location-specific regulatory knowledge
(Haveman, 1995). Evidence of a profession of banker
includes professional associations (Lounsbury, 2002)
and theAmerican Banker, a daily periodical that has
been published since the 1830s, as well as popular
books such as Martin Mayer’s (1997) The Bankers.
Thus, a greater number of bank foundings is likely
in communities in which there is a strong profes-
sional presence.
Hypothesis 4. The greater the number of bank
professionals in a community, the greater the
founding rate of new banks in that community.
However, the actions of entrepreneurs who cre-
ate new organizations do not occur in an institu-
tional vacuum (Scott, 2001) and, as we have argued
earlier, competing institutional logics have impor-
tantly shaped the behavior of actors in the U.S.
banking field over a long period of time. In partic-
ular, we argue that the geographic locus of actors
tied to community and national banking logics may
be important. Thus, although extant explanations
of bank foundings have tended to focus on aggre-
gate rates of acquisition, it may be helpful to dis-
tinguish between acquisitions that are made by
peer firms within a community, where the result is
maintenance of community-based financial ser-
vices and a community logic, and those undertaken
by national firms, which lead to the aforemen-
tioned siphoning away of banking assets and the
introduction of a national logic. Substantial survey-
based and anecdotal data suggest that acquisitions
by national firms generate greater resistance be-
cause such banks have fewer ties to local stakehold-
ers and make decisions about resource allocation
remotely, often without adequate consideration of
the impact on a local economy.
Researchers in economics have suggested, for ex-
ample, that local borrowers are hostile to out-of-
market banks (Seelig & Critchfield, 2002), a feeling
that should be reflected in consumers’ reacting neg-
atively to having larger, increasingly nonlocal
banks invade their communities. Even if outright
hostility is not observed, there is overwhelming
evidence that people like to bank with local firms,
the tradition of local banking being much ingrained
in the U.S. population. For instance, national sur-
veys conducted in 1989 (Elliehausen & Wolken,
1992) and 1995 (Kwast, Starr-McCluer, & Wolken,
1997) showed that households overwhelmingly
choose local depository institutions, especially lo-
cal commercial banks, when given a choice be-
tween local and national banks. As countless press
accounts following bank mergers have suggested,
consumers want a “place where you are known by
name and your financial record does not have to be
spelled out to a new bank officer every time you
want a transaction” (Nadler, 2001: 38). In general,
acquisitions by outsiders can create considerable
uncertainty by introducing a new national logic
into a community, opening up opportunities for
new firm creation (e.g., McGrath & Macmillan,
2000). Thus, we also expect the effects of out-of-
town acquisitions on community bank foundings to
be greater than that of within-community acquisi-
tions. Hence,
Hypothesis 5. The greater the number of acqui-
sitions by out-of-town banks in a community,
the greater the founding rate of new banks in
that community.
Hypothesis 6. Acquisitions by out-of-town
banks in a community will have a greater effect
on the founding rate of new banks in that com-
munity than acquisitions by local banks.
To more powerfully demonstrate the effects of
competing institutional logics, however, it is im-
portant to show how they differentially shape be-
havior (see Lounsbury, 2007). This goal can be use-
fully approached by assessing interactions between
carriers of logics (e.g., national banks) and actors
driving change processes of interest (e.g., profes-
sionals creating community banks), focusing on
how such actions are institutionally contingent
(e.g., Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001; Schneiberg &
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Clemens, 2006). In this case, we expect the effect of
professionals to be strongest when community
banks are acquisition targets of out-of-town, na-
tional banks. Put another way, we expect that ac-
quisitions made by out-of-town banks will be a
positive moderator of the effect of the number of
banking professionals on new bank foundings. As
we theorized above, it is these outsider banks that
generate substantial resistance in communities by
introducing a national logic. To wit, we expect that
the existence of a pool of local bank professionals
in concert with acquisitions by outsider banks will
more likely catalyze resistance in the form of new
community bank foundings.
This focus on the relationship between profes-
sionals and competing logics is particularly illumi-
nating in the context of banking. To the extent that
a local banking market is subject to acquisitions by
national banks, often headquartered far from the
target banks, professional autonomy is threatened.
In smaller, local banks, major decisions are made
locally, not at a geographically distant headquar-
ters. As institutional theorists have documented,
professional identity is a significant driver of ac-
tion, especially when autonomy is challenged,
whether within organizations (e.g., Powell, 1985)
or over an entire field or industry (e.g., Scott et al.,
2000). Many studies document how professionals
under threat mobilize to create new or transform
existing organizations (e.g., Brint & Karabel, 1991;
DiMaggio, 1991; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996). Brint and
Karabel (1991), for instance, explained how early
presidents of junior colleges, realizing that they
were becoming increasingly locked into lower sta-
tus in the academic hierarchy, despite resistance
from consumers and business, developed an alter-
native strategy: to transition from transfer-oriented
institutions to institutions providing terminal vo-
cational education.
Further, although the justification for acquisi-
tions and mergers is often staff reduction and reor-
ganization (Birch, 1987; Unger, 1986; Walsh, 1988),
acquisitions undertaken by outsiders tend to be
more hostile, creating greater dislocation and dis-
satisfaction (Newton, 1988). In addition, executive
turnover in an acquisition target is more likely
when target and acquirer are dissimilar (Hambrick
& Cannella, 1993). Focusing more on individuals’
financial resources created by “liquidity events,”
Stuart and Sorenson (2003) also argued that events
that break leaders’ ties to their organization may
lead to entrepreneurial action. In the wake of merg-
ers, some banking professionals might be forced to
leave, and others may exit voluntarily to seek au-
tonomy via the creation of new banks (see Buono &
Bowditch, 1989). Numerous articles in the business
press and banking trade journals offer anecdotal
support for the idea that acquisitions of local banks
by outsiders lead to a population of bank execu-
tives who become activists in reshaping the mix of
their communities’ banking institutions (e.g., Ep-
stein, 1996; Gillam, 1998; Murray, 1998; Zellner,
1998).
As noted above, these professionals can tap into
the historic antipathy toward the logic promulgated
by national banks by appealing to consumers and
small businesses that prefer doing business with
community-focused firms. Thus, Moore and Skel-
ton’s (1998) “paradoxical” finding that bank merg-
ers beget bank foundings might be driven by the
unexplored process whereby acquisitions by out-
of-town banks precipitate efforts by professional
bankers to create new, community-oriented banks.
As press accounts and banking research suggest,
efforts to maintain or regain local and professional
identities as well as to resist efforts of national
banks to dominate a community’s banking infra-
structure motivate these creations. Thus, the signif-
icant dynamic may not be the mere presence of
individual professionals, or even mere acquisitions
by out-of-town firms, but the interaction between
these two forces. Hence,
Hypothesis 7. The greater the interaction be-
tween local bank professionals and acquisi-
tions by out-of-town banks in a community, the
greater the founding rate of new banks in that
community.
METHODS AND ANALYSES
Sample and Units of Analysis
We examined our hypotheses at the community
level of analysis in data from 1994 to 2002. We took
this approach for two interrelated reasons. First,
entrepreneurship is theorized to be a community-
level phenomenon, yet little empirical work exists
on the topic (Romanelli & Schoonhoven, 2001). An
additional important reason, one that differentiates
banking from other industries, is that geographic
community is traditionally seen as defining the
main market for banking services. The years stud-
ied, 1994 to 2002, are significant because they en-
capsulate the period of full nationalization of U.S.
banking triggered by the 1994 Riegle-Neil act and
following the banking crisis of the late 1980s and
early 1990s (Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, 1997).
We defined community in terms of the metropol-
itan statistical areas (MSAs) established by the Of-
fice of Management and Budget as of June 6, 2003.
We included not only units officially designated
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MSAs, but also metropolitan divisions of MSAs
(these are similar to the earlier PMSAs; for exam-
ple, the Philadelphia MSA has metropolitan divi-
sions of both Philadelphia proper and Wilmington,
Delaware). As of the date noted above, there were
379 of these geographical areas. Examining these
379 communities from 1994 to 2002 gave us 3,411
community-year observations. As noted, the time
period is opportune for this analysis because it
begins with a change in regulation that might have
had an effect on bank foundings and mergers.
The main source of community market data, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC)
Summary of Deposits, which began online coverage
in 1994 (http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp), pro-
vides annual branch-level data on all banking
branches in the United States, an average of more
than 80,000 observations per year. We constructed
a branch-level database that contains 751,581 ob-
servations for the entire nine-year period. To con-
struct our community measures, we aggregated
these data to the MSA level.
Dependent variable: Local founding rate.Most
organizational analysis of the creation of new firms
models founding as an event count (Carroll & Han-
nan, 2000); we specifically followed Stuart and So-
rensen (2003) in focusing on the number of found-
ings per community-year.2 Figure 1 plots the
distribution of the 1,136 new banks founded during
this period in the communities we studied.3
One can see from the figure that there were fewer
than 50 foundings in 1994, the year Reigle-Neal
was passed. In 1999, there were more than 200 and,
despite a decrease after 1999, approximately 100
new banks were founded in both 2001 and 2002.
Independent variables. We created measures of
recent bank acquisition activity in the communities
we studied. Specifically, we counted the number of
acquisitions in MSA and divided the total into
counts of acquisitions in MSA by local firms, firms
that would likely adhere to the same community
logic as the firms they were acquiring, and acqui-
sitions by out-of-town firms—firms that represent a
more national logic of geographic diversification.4
Following the economic work on banking, we mea-
sured these variables as the sum of the numbers of
acquisitions in the prior two years (Keeton, 2000).
Use of this time period is corroborated by press
accounts indicating that two years represents the
lag between acquisitions and foundings (Epstein,
1996). Of 1,939 acquisitions of smaller local banks
during the period 1994–2002, 1,195 were acquisi-
tions by out-of-town firms, and 744 were acquisi-
tions by other local firms.5 Figure 2 graphically
depicts these acquisition trends.
In line with standard resource partitioning mea-
surement (e.g., Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000), we
measured market concentration as the four-firm
concentration ratio. This is a measure of the per-
centage of bank deposits in each MSA held by the
four largest firms in the MSA. To measure the local
2 In its use of a count measure, this study diverges
from the economic literature on bank founding, which
focuses on dichotomous entry (Berger et al., 1999) or total
initial assets (Keeton, 2000). Because our theory and
hypotheses predict founding rates, not just where found-
ings will occur, a count was better than an indicator
variable. Also, total initial assets was not an appropriate
measure for our study, as it describes initial bank suc-
cess, not bank professionals’ motivation to found banks.
3 Much of the work on entrepreneurship and new or-
ganizational founding has been criticized for its success
bias (Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003), because firms and
entrepreneurs are usually studied only after surviving for
an undetermined period. But intense regulatory over-
sight of the banking industry requires that newly
founded banks file with multiple state and federal agen-
cies before opening, and these same sources track the
financial performance of firms from this point forward.
Thus, studying foundings in the banking industry should
provide deeper insights into founding processes than
studies that rely on retrospective accounts of survivors.
4 We also measured acquisitions by out-of-state firms
as one way to tap acquiring banks that may be larger and
hence more likely to focus on center-of-the-market strat-
egies, which are not as local and are more amenable to
economies of scale. Results were quite consistent.
5 Our definition of mergers and acquisitions differs
from definitions in prior economic work on banking;
unlike Berger et al. (1999), we excluded all mergers that
occurred within the same holding company. Although a
“merger” of separately chartered banks in the same com-
pany might be a source of customer disruptions that
could lead to new bank foundings (Berger and col-
leagues’ argument), our theory is based on new takeovers
by out-of-town, national firms.
FIGURE 1
Number of Bank Foundings
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presence of generalist banks with disproportionate
market power, we drew on Carroll’s definition of a
generalist as an organization that “compete[s] in a
variety of domains simultaneously” (1985: 1266).
Our variable, conceptually in line with the eco-
nomic work on banking (Berger et al., 1999; Keeton,
2000), provides an interesting contrast to the con-
centration index typically used to test both eco-
nomic and resource partitioning theories. We cre-
ated a variable that identifies banks that have
developed substantial franchises in all of the major
types of banking (and hence are generalists). In the
Federal Reserve of Chicago Commercial Bank data-
base, we examined banks’ individual, business,
and real estate loans (either to individuals or busi-
nesses) at the end of each year. We found that for a
number of years, approximately 20 percent of bank-
ing firms made no loans to individuals, and to be
conservative we identified all banks that were
above the 25th percentile in individual loans, con-
sidering these to be firms that had at least a foot-
hold in their local retail market. We then looked at
commercial and real estate loans and, to be consis-
tent, also created a cut-off of 25th percentile to
identify organizations that had developed a sub-
stantial presence in these market segments. This
approach is in line with recent ecological opera-
tionalizations of generalism, which often require
context-specific knowledge to assess an organiza-
tion’s scope over relevant markets. For instance, to
distinguish generalists and specialists in the brew-
ing industry, Carroll and Swaminathan (2000: 736)
identified whether firms were mass production,
micro, pub, or contract brewers and, for firms com-
peting in multiple segments, they created a hierar-
chal counting rule for firm identity (for example, a
firm that had both mass production and a brew pub
was considered a mass production firm). To iden-
tify a generalist bank that might be able to exercise
disproportionate market power in a local retail set-
ting of newly founded banks, we counted all organ-
izations within a community-year that had a signif-
icant presence in all the above-listed market
segments.
Since none of the banking databases we used had
a measure of number of bank professionals, we
relied on databases of public firms for this measure.
We identified approximately 2,500 banks that ex-
isted during this period in the COMPUSTAT data-
base and totaled the number headquartered in each
of our communities each year. We then summed
these firms’ total employees to gauge the number of
bank professionals in a communities’ population in
a given year. It would have been ideal to have
employee data from all existing banks, but in the
absence of such data, the extensive coverage of
banks in COMPUSTAT is, we feel, a robust alter-
native; it may in fact offer a conservative test, as
this database likely underestimates the number of
local banking professionals and hence the human
capital available in a community. To be consistent
with our acquisitions operationalizations, here we
also used data from the two years prior to a focal
year. We averaged the numbers of bank profession-
als in banks headquartered in a given MSA over the
two years.
Control variables. The baseline for studies of
new venture creation is how an economic environ-
ment, in particular, opportunities in a local market,
creates an incentive for starting new firms. For ex-
ample, Reynolds, Miller, and Maki (1995) demon-
strated in all industry sectors from 1976 to 1988
that factors such as personal wealth, population
growth, and overall economic base were associated
with greater numbers of new venture foundings.
Here, a number of control variables captured these
FIGURE 2
Number of Bank Acquisitions
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socioeconomic features of our communities. From
the U.S. Commerce Department, we obtained for
each of our community-years data on per capita
income and population growth for the previous
year (thus, lagged one year). From the FDIC Sum-
mary of Deposits database, we calculated the level
of local savings (deposits in thousands), an impor-
tant measure of banking market attractiveness that,
along with the size of a community, influences
bank founding activity (Rose, 1977; Siegfried &
Evans, 1994).6 We used FDIC data through June 30
for savings, but our dependent variable relies on
data through December 31, so the savings variable
is lagged half a year. Since a large number of organ-
izations can deplete available resources and de-
press new foundings in a niche (Carroll & Hannan,
2000), we included a measure of local organization-
al density; this was the logarithm of a count, taken
from the FDIC database, of the number of different
banking institutions operating branches in a com-
munity. To control for the wave of national mergers
(Stearns & Allan, 1996), we included the number of
bank mergers that had occurred outside a focal
community in the previous two years and also a
linear time trend variable (year) to account for the
time elapsed since the Riegle-Neil act.
Statistical Models
We followed Carroll and Swaminathan (2000)
and modeled our counts of foundings in each com-
munity as a zero-inflated Poisson model (Long,
1997).7 This was the most appropriate model for a
number of reasons. First, approximately 84 percent
of our community-year observations did not con-
tain a founding event, which suggests that different
dynamics underlie the zero and nonzero observa-
tions. A zero-inflated model estimates an outcome
with two equations, one predicting the occurrence
of nonzero counts and the other, the count of
foundings. In modeling the zeros, we relied on the
underlying economic conditions of the communi-
ties, reflected by the variables for population
growth and local savings. A Poisson model was
appropriate for the counts in this situation because
the overdispersion in the data resulted entirely
from the zero observations. When the zero observa-
tions were excluded, the mean and standard devi-
ation were nearly identical. And a final consider-
ation was that not all observations were
independent, as community-level data were iden-
tical for all organizations in each community. To
correct for this, we used the cluster subcommand in
STATA to adjust our standard errors to account for
the multiple observations per community.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and corre-
lations, and Table 2 gives the regression equation
results for the 379 communities from 1994 to 2002.
In Table 2, we present a number of models for
informational purposes, indicating the associated
hypothesis number next to the appropriate vari-
able. In models 1 to 8, we present models with all of
the hypothesized main effects and the combined
acquisition variable. Models 9 to 16 are models
with acquisitions decomposed into those by banks
local to an MSA and those by out-of-town banks.
Model 1 presents only the control variables, and
models 2 to 5 present this base model and main
effects relating to acquisitions, concentration, bank
professionals, and generalist organizations. Given
the close conceptual relationship between concen-
tration and generalist organizations, we also
present an informational model with those two
variables (model 6). We begin interpreting our find-
ings using model 7, the full model with all main
effects. Regarding Hypothesis 1, as predicted on the
basis of the standard explanations in the banking
literature, the level of acquisitions in the previous
two years is a strongly significant predictor of num-
ber of foundings, which suggests that mergers in a
local environment establish the conditions for sub-
sequent bank foundings. The concentration vari-
able hypothesized to have a positive effect on
foundings in Hypothesis 2 is positive and statisti-
cally significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed
test) lending support to the standard resource par-
titioning hypothesis. Conversely, there is also
strong support for the dampening effect of powerful
generalist organizations in a community on bank
foundings, supporting Hypothesis 3. We consider
the potential sources and implications of these con-
trasting findings in our Discussion (below). The
effect of local bank professionals on foundings is
not statistically significant; hence, Hypothesis 4 is
not supported. As noted, however, because this
measure underestimates the human capital in a
community, it is likely a conservative test of our
claims.
To better test our institutional ecology account
6 This variable is correlated at 0.92 with local popula-
tion. Including local population did not change reported
results, As a further sensitivity test, we also ran analyses
on the 88 cities with over one million in population and
again, results are consistent.
7 ZIP command in STATA; we also ran the models
using a negative binomial specification with similar
results.
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focused on competing logics, we shifted to a series
of models embodying a finer-grained conceptual-
ization of acquisitions, separating out those made
by firms from outside a focal community. Models 9
through 13, which are presented only for informa-
tional purposes, show the effects of the main vari-
ables of interest when they are included with the
two types of acquisitions, mirroring the models
described above. In model 14, we present tests of
Hypotheses 5 and 6, which focus on how out-of-
town acquisitions are the most important drivers of
foundings, not acquisitions more generally. The
out-of-town acquisitions variable is strongly signif-
icant, providing support for Hypothesis 5. Note that
local acquisitions is also significant, which sug-
gests that some of the economics arguments under-
lying Hypothesis 1 may hold as well. We are heart-
ened by the fact, however, that the coefficient for
out-of-town acquisitions is actually much larger
than that for local acquisitions (2  24.45, df  2,
p  .00001), which supports Hypothesis 6. Thus,
although the economics explanation of this rela-
tionship in terms of market pressure may be par-
tially true, our hypotheses and results suggest that
firms from outside a community face different and
more substantial pressures, likely relating to the
historically rooted resistance to outsider banks we
described earlier.
Model 15 presents our tests of Hypothesis 7, stat-
ing that acquisitions made by out-of-town banks are
a positive moderator of the effect of the number of
banking professionals on new bank foundings. As
predicted, this coefficient is positive, supporting
Hypothesis 7 regarding interaction between num-
ber of bank professionals and community resis-
tance. Note the contrast between model 15 and
models 8 and 16, in which we show the interac-
tions between bank professionals and total and lo-
cal acquisitions, respectively. Neither is signifi-
cant, which suggests that it is not acquisitions per
se that are important to understanding community
resistance to national banks, but that—in keeping
with our theory and many anecdotal examples—
acquisitions pursued by out-of-town banks are the
salient events that spur action by local profession-
als. To aid visualization of this effect, in Figure 3
we graph the predicted effects of the banking pro-
fessional interaction with out-of-town acquisitions
using a method from Stewart and Barrick (2000). In
this graph, we show the effects on number of banks
founded in a community for two levels of out-of-
town acquisitions, low (minus one standard devia-
tion from the mean) and high (plus one standard
deviation from the mean). We then plotted the
number of banking foundings regressed on differ-
ent levels of local bank professionals. Figure 3
shows that the highest level of bank foundings in a
community occurred when both bank professionals
and out-of-town acquisitions were high. From our
analyses, we conclude that out-of-town acquisi-
tions accentuate the effect of professionals on new
bank foundings in communities to a much greater
degree than acquisitions by local firms.
Results of the control variables are all as would
be expected on the basis of the existing banking
(e.g., Berger et al., 1999) and entrepreneurship
(Reynolds, Miller, & Maki, 1995) literatures. As ex-
pected, banks are founded where there is already a
FIGURE 3
Effect on New Bank Foundings of the Interaction of the Numbers of
Banking Professionals and Out-of-Town Acquisitions, 1994–2002
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significant banking presence and the population of
banks is expanding. Further, a variable capturing
the national merger wave (acquisitions from out-
side a focal community) was significant, further
suggesting that the national consolidation spurred
the new bank foundings we observed.
These results as a whole illustrate the complexity
of new bank foundings in local communities and
provide substantial support for our perspective on
how competing institutional logics facilitate resis-
tance to change. Although existing predictions re-
garding competitive processes stemming from eco-
nomics in some sense set the baseline for studies of
community bank foundings, our results suggest
that economics does not provide the whole story.
Building on the long-standing tension between na-
tional and community logics, our results highlight
how this conflict persists and how the context of
community banking remains highly politicized. Lo-
cal banking professionals founded new banks in
the wake of out-of town acquisitions and, just as
strenuously, larger national banks strove to main-
tain their market power. We discuss implications
for theories of institutional change and resistance
below.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we explored how the growing
dominance of nationally oriented banks has been
resisted in some U.S. communities. Following legal
changes that allowed and encouraged banks to ex-
tend their reaches beyond the states where their
headquarters were located, acquisitions by banks
seeking to expand their domains increased dramat-
ically. In some communities, local politicians, cit-
izens, activists, and consumers contested this pro-
cess, shifting their banking to firms that were more
consistent with their ideology of and interest in
locally headquartered financial institutions. Empir-
ically, we specifically explored how the growth of
bank acquisitions by outsider, national firms fos-
tered resistance in the form of new community
bank creation. Focusing on the historically rooted
competing logics underlying the organization of
U.S. banking enabled us to provide a nuanced ac-
count that goes beyond extant explanations of this
phenomenon to illuminate the conditions under
which professionals in a community can resist
broader consolidation efforts.
Although our evidence supports some general
arguments in the banking literature that bank ac-
quisitions can spur new bank creation in a commu-
nity (e.g., Berger et al., 1999), this existing explana-
tion does not go far enough in specifying and
testing the particular mechanisms through which
and conditions under which acquisitions drive
bank foundings. We drew on institutional and eco-
logical approaches to organizational analysis—es-
pecially on recent efforts to understand how com-
peting logics create variation in the practices and
behaviors of distinct groups of actors—to focus at-
tention on the dynamics that undergird national
bank expansion and the countermovement of new
community bank creation. We showed that, under
conditions of acquisition-driven expansion of na-
tional banks, a community’s ability to spawn as a
countervailing force new, local banks depended on
the existence of a pool of professional bankers. We
showed the effect of professionally driven local
bank creation to be even greater when acquisitions
in a community were specifically undertaken by
out-of-town, national banks. This finding supports
our contention that the creation of new banks in
communities was a form of resistance to the efforts
of national banks to control resource allocation de-
cisions in those communities.
Contributions to Institutional Ecology
Our findings are of interest to scholars forging an
institutional ecology approach, especially those
who focus on resource partitioning and organiza-
tional founding processes. An important point of
departure from other ecological work that analyzes
industry dynamics and career mobility (Haveman &
Cohen, 1994; Stuart & Sorenson, 2003) is that our
model focuses on the founding of new firms as an
interaction between local professionals and organ-
izational dynamics. Our work extends this stream
by emphasizing how competing logics, particularly
those rooted in geographic difference (Lounsbury,
2007; Marquis et al., 2007), both influence these
processes and offer a more refined understanding
of the relationship between acquisitions and found-
ings. Although Haveman and Cohen (1994) showed
how mergers among California savings and loans
enabled first-order mobility for bank executives,
they also posited a second-order effect of blocked
mobility. Even though they did not focus on new
bank creation, to the extent that acquisitions facil-
itate foundings by professionals, mobility may be
enhanced both directly and indirectly.
That is, bank creation by professionals exiting an
acquired bank may provide a model for other pro-
fessionals to follow and create more new banks. In
addition, new bank creation further increases mo-
bility for professionals, opening up possibilities to
join more independent community-oriented banks;
Haveman and Cohen (1994) actually supported this
association, showing that many professionals mi-
grate to newly founded banks after their current
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banks have been acquired. Further work is needed
to specify the conditions under which the indirect
effect of mergers and acquisitions enhances mobil-
ity, and such work will require finer-grained data
on individual professionals and their movements
between organizations.
An additional distinction between the current
study and the ecological literature is that we at-
tempted to tease apart the concentration-based ar-
guments underlying resource partitioning and the
market power arguments typically made by econo-
mists (Amel & Liang, 1997; Scherer, 1980). Not
typically seen as competing approaches, these two
literatures in fact contain opposite predictions and
findings regarding the effects of market concentra-
tion. To that end, we find that both processes exist
and that some of the divergent findings may relate
to measurement issues. Given our results, we deem
concentration, which suggests a crowding of mar-
ket niches, to be a better measure of resource par-
titioning, but we consider measures such as ours—
measures that tap the existence of dominant
generalist organizations (as distinct from concen-
tration)—to be better operationalizations of econo-
mists’ market power arguments. Our results suggest
that market power can come from organizational
characteristics other than size and that the presence
of powerful generalists and market concentration
can be distinct phenomena, despite being typically
discussed as similar in both of these literatures.
Future researchers may want to explore these pro-
cesses in more detail.
Although the concentration results are a nice cor-
roboration of existing resource partitioning find-
ings, we feel our study goes beyond standard re-
source partitioning theory in at least a couple of
important ways that we hope will aid future schol-
ars in that area. First, focusing our analyses on a
short period allowed us to uncover some of the
detailed activity and mechanisms—in this case,
competing logics and the human capital of profes-
sionals—underlying observed relationships that
the generally long-term historical perspective of
ecologists may mask. Consolidation typically oc-
curs in a punctuated fashion (Stearns & Allan,
1996), and so looking at periods of intense consol-
idation is particularly valuable for testing a theory
that analyses such punctuated processes. Second,
we extend the cultural approach to consumption
proffered by Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) to
encompass the cultural ideology and motivations
of entrepreneurs, particularly in situations marked
by different visions of industry organization
(Lounsbury, 2007). Such a direction suggests an
opportunity for a more complete engagement be-
tween the institutional and ecological literatures
and the scholarship on entrepreneurship (see, e.g.,
Aldrich & Ruef, 2006).
Resistance and Institutional Change
Consolidation and concentration may be baseline
conditions for studies of new firm creation in the
U.S. banking industry, but our results suggest that
understanding the opposing logics that have under-
girded competition in the history of U.S. banking
provides additional insight into how the structure
of community banking has changed recently. When
out-of-town banks, carriers of a national logic of
garnering efficiencies from geographic diversifica-
tion, invaded communities by acquiring local
firms, some community members resisted these ef-
forts and supported foundings of new firms that
more authentically tapped their values. Thus, even
though institutionalists have suggested that profes-
sionals can play a key role as institutional entre-
preneurs who create and catalyze institutional
change (e.g., Battilana, 2006; DiMaggio, 1991; Scott,
2001), here we emphasize that the actions of such
professionals are fundamentally shaped by broader
institutional logics.
In our case, we showed how professionals in a
community can be an especially important source
of support for opposition to larger entities when
those entities espouse goals and beliefs that are
antithetical to those in the community. Bankers
may have a stronger professional identity than pro-
fessionals in other industries, making mobilization
and resistance easier for them, yet we believe these
arguments may have broad generalizability. Pen-
nings (1982), for example, found the level of engi-
neering employment to have a positive effect on
foundings of technology firms. Although he did not
emphasize professional resistance, we know from
other studies of technology start-up dynamics that
highly skilled engineers, who tend to value inde-
pendence and autonomy, are quick to exercise the
exit option and join or start other organizations
when their old organizations become too en-
trenched or bureaucratic (Saxenian, 1994; Stuart &
Sorenson, 2003). Meyer’s (1994) observation that
such a supply-side approach to new venture cre-
ation is broadly suited to the sciences and profes-
sions suggests that the members of a broad group of
occupations might respond similarly.
By focusing on new community bank creation as
a form of professional resistance that is contingent
on institutional logics, we explicitly move the
study of organizational dynamics and foundings in
a more institutional direction. Whereas much of
organizational demography focuses on nationwide,
population-level processes, we emphasize here the
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relationship between national and community log-
ics that highlights how organizational evolution is
fundamentally shaped by broader institutional be-
liefs that can be rooted in geography (see also
Lounsbury, 2007). And although earlier investiga-
tors of the intersection of organization and commu-
nity concluded that organizations were coming to
rely less on their geographic environments, more
recent investigations suggest that embeddedness in
communities has an enduring influence on the or-
ganizations and professional actors therein (Free-
man & Audia, 2006; Marquis, 2003; Marquis et al.,
2007; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Future investiga-
tors, building on the insights of Romanelli and
Schoonhoven (2001), might examine further the
importance of local contexts and logics to under-
standing entrepreneurial action and other aspects
of organizational behavior.
Our emphasis on resistance also contributes to
the study of organizational variation and change.
Though the institutionalist emphasis on isomor-
phism has shifted toward accounting for more het-
erogeneous processes and outcomes (e.g., Kraatz &
Moore, 2002; Leblebici et al., 1991; Maguire et al.,
2004), this work has tended to ignore resistance to
institutional forces (Oliver, 1991). Resistance is
particularly important because it can not only ar-
rest institutional change, but can also facilitate
organizational variety. In the study of diffusion,
resistance might help to explain adoption/non-
adoption behavior and also the emergence of new
variants of practices that are tailored to local con-
ditions. When, for example, the Czech Republic
adopted neoliberal market reforms, many of its in-
stitutions remained unchanged because of resis-
tance from the established elite. This resistance
enabled the creation of unique market institutions
that were hybrids of old institutional ideas and
rules and the new neoliberal templates being pro-
moted by the World Bank and other actors (Rao &
Hirsch, 2003).
A key contribution of our study to the examina-
tion of resistance to institutional change is to em-
phasize that, as Oliver (1991) suggested, it cannot
be completely understood as a narrow strategic re-
sponse, but should be viewed as potentially actu-
ated by institutional logics. Our logic-centered per-
spective redirects attention away from resistance as
an instrumental action of particular actors and to-
ward an understanding of resistance as socially
structured by competing logics and other kinds of
fracture lines that define dimensions of conflict in
organizational fields (Schneiberg, 2007). We in-
ferred resistance from extensive historical evidence
coupled with our quantitative analyses; future re-
search should, however, seek more direct mea-
sures. In particular, it would be helpful to have
qualitative studies that probe actors’ accounts for
various kinds of resistance, including the founding
of new community-oriented organizations empha-
sized in our study. A key step in this direction is
the examination of how and under what conditions
actors can mobilize resources and relationships in a
social movement–like process to create effective
resistance (Davis et al., 2005), but much more needs
to be done.
Such research could be usefully complemented
and extended by work in entrepreneurship empha-
sizing the importance of human and relational cap-
ital and other individual-level processes related to
the identification of, and ability to seize, opportu-
nities by creating new ventures (e.g., Hitt et al.,
2001, 2006). Our study reaffirms arguments in the
entrepreneurship literature that entrepreneurial
opportunities are not objectively identified but are
rooted in the interpretive processes of actors (e.g.,
Audia, Freeman, & Reynolds, 2006; Buchanan &
Vanberg, 1991; Sarasvathy, 2001; Shane, 2000; So-
renson & Audia, 2000). We extend this literature by
highlighting how such interpretive processes can
be shaped not only by the prior knowledge or other
individual attributes of a potential entrepreneur,
but also by institutional beliefs such as logics (see
also Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Very little research
on how logics shape entrepreneurship exists; in our
view, such a line of research represents an impor-
tant direction for future inquiry.
There may be further research opportunities as
well in some of the limitations we noted earlier.
First, our measure of bank professionals could be
more precise and, to further explore the mecha-
nisms underlying these relationships, future re-
searchers might survey these entrepreneurs or track
their career progression (Haveman & Cohen, 1994).
New bank leadership and contact information
available in the databases mentioned earlier would
facilitate such data collection. We were also limited
here by the absence of comprehensive data on the
sizes of acquisitions in the databases we used. We
would expect that such size data would further
clarify our findings, as it would allow for finer
measurement of the acquisitions variables. When
we included the size data for the approximately 80
percent of the acquisitions for which these data
existed, results were encouraging but not conclu-
sive. Consistently with our theory, the size of non-
local acquisitions had a positive and marginally
significant effect on foundings, and the size of local
acquisitions had a negative effect. Because of the
high number of missing observations, we viewed it
as more appropriate to present the results with the
more complete count data.
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In sum, the merging of institutional and ecologi-
cal perspectives can be greatly enhanced by exam-
ining microlevel processes that involve entrepre-
neurs and other actors in detailed and engaged
ways. Exploring such ground-level dynamics and
actors will yield a richer appreciation of the heter-
ogeneity of fields and the tensions that both enable
and constrain institutional change. In turn, such an
approach will also contribute to a better under-
standing of the sources of organizational variety
and change, a question to which few answers exist
after three decades of sustained research in organ-
izational demography and neoinstitutionalism.
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